

GOD IN THE DARŚANAS

Theism is the belief in God¹. Taken in a very general sense what is implied by theism is that it not only affirms his existence but also shows that it not only affirms his existence but also shows that such a God is intimately related to the historical process of the universe and the individuals. There are very many ways in which this relation could be defined. Some keep God aloof from the process whilst granting his existence; some others make God and the universe identical; some keep God as the *beau ideal* for all and nothing more; some others expect that ideal Person to help in the efforts of the individuals; some make God the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of the Universe; some others grant Him only absolute transcendence; some name him only the more governor of the Universe; some others the efficient cause of this universe; and some make him all these and in addition the material cause, some make God the power that is of the good struggling for the success of the good and the right against the evil and powers of darkness which co-exist with Him; some others try to explain that the powers of evil and the powers of light are both the products of the will of God existing for the purpose of revealing that the powers of light

¹ Personal God is God. There cannot be an impersonal God, according to theism. Personal God is refuted on the ground of his being but a 'mask' (Personal) or personification of the Absolute. He is a creator etc of the phenomenal world. But according to Absolutism the Absolute is the ground of all things and as such it is much truer to affirm impersonalism or Atheism. On the other hand since this possibility of being ground and source and creator etc. are all implicit in the original Being, we must more rightly hold that Absolute is both impersonal and personal, ground and creator-cause.

despite great turmoil and suffering have the innate power to win the kingdom of the world for God, and that the creation is an occasion and filed for the triumph of

virtue over vice, a supreme effort in which all souls combine to aid or thwart the powers of light; God in this case is a spectator interested in the right albeit, but not participating in it. Some other hold that God is incarnating as the Sage, Creator, Teacher, Messenger at crucial periods of this historical struggle between the powers of light and of darkness, interposing His righteous will for the establishment of the right after periods of darkness.

The hopes of men for redemption and salvation are sought to be fulfilled by a miraculous advent of God or His messenger or His seers, who supply the necessary effort to them by energizing their consciousness and leading them through an emotional toning up, through a philosophy of life, or a way of Ācāra, to the summit of happiness. This has been seen to be the care with the religions that have been named after their founders, namely Buddhism, Confucianis, Zoroastranism (also called Mazdaism), Jainism Christianity, Mohammedanism (also called Islam). But throughout we can also discover that these names are not really the true names. Each of the religions sought to be known after the truth that they stood for. It is however a convenient thing for outsiders to name them after their founders.

Not all the philosophical schools in India accept god. Indeed Sākhya and Mīmāṃsā and others outside the Vedic pale did not feel the necessity for the acceptance of God. The fact seems to be that either they were not willing to give up the right to struggle for the truth or they found that a God as defined by ordinary religion did not reflect the highest that they knew as necessary for the realization of their happiness. The law of life being known to be the strict law of Prakṛit and its various manifestations or modifications, with which the soul of man had absolutely no connection, there resulted the freedom from the false idea that man is bound or that he should earn his freedom. Mīmāṃsā held that the results needed not the *prasāda* or grace of the gods who have been sacrificed to. This was a turn towards naturalism and change, which they considered was more efficacious. They revealed a pragmatic enjoined it, was objective, that is,

independent of its author once set in motion¹. Nor were the logical schools more compromising. They too held that the processes of the universe finally have to be referred to an *adr̥ṣṭā* which when closely inspected turns out to be a *svabhāva* or naturalistic of reason trying to find out other ways than intuition or śāstra for explaining the process. The stage was set for discovering the conditions of happiness here or freedom or dharma (way) by these three schools: all the three had presented a picture of atheism or denial of God; for it is precisely the purpose of a revulsion against God to exalt the individual intelligence and will and individual ability. The tendency thus is clearly.

¹ The Buddha held a similar view if we only perceive the fact that the Dharma is a law of the Nirvaṇic states, even as Karma is the law inexorable of the Samsāra or phenomenal. The fact is that they are reversals of one another. And the question of the Deity was never essential either.

individualistic, materialistic or mechanical. The soul which was accepted in the Sāṅkhya as bound by Prakṛti's modification is shown to have never indeed enmeshed; and happiness that was lost was never lost at all. This is undoubtedly due to the expectation that intellect will solve the difficulties; only its solutions showed that unless it starts with the conclusions it seeks to arrive at, it can never draw the conclusions it arrived at! This is the pathetic fallacy of reason. It must assume what it has to prove. The pathos of this position is avoided undoubtedly by Mīmāṃs, the *Pūrvā Mīmāṃsā*, which some writers contend should never be divorced from the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* (the vedānta), as they form one thesis. But having divorced it as some have done, and it is with them we have just now to deal, the position is that they had exalted the practice, the ritual, and have shown that this being done what consequences follow. So admirably, and in the scientific manner (or pseudo-scientific manner) they have drawn up in meticulous detail how things have to be performed so as to yield results without the intervention or dependence on any God, This mechanization of ritual has led up to a magical theory. Whilst magic promises the fruits here and now, this theory

promises or assures on the basis of Veda, or superhuman revelation and its truth, that they will happen after death. A supernatural magician is the Pūvamīmāmsin, reveling under the garb of science and strict causality. Bu the *Apūrva* theory is in a worse predicament. It is the definition of possibility in the future, of a not yet gathering its momentum till fruition, or coming suddenly into existence at that fruitional moment. This is a wise ignorance which promises the confluence of fruits and persons in the undefined and undefinable hereafter, without the help of an agent or ordainer.

The inspection of what the concept of God means to the several systems will show why God was affirmed by them, in other words, the clear understanding of the attributes of God is a necessity imposed by the revealed contradiction in the reasons offered by the systems. We may at the very start affirm that reason cannot prove God, as it definitely intimates that the source of this Knowledge of God and His nature is the scripture alone (Śāstrayonitvāt.I.i.3). Others have given reasons for the existence or acceptance of God, and some have denied that such a God is either a necessity of thought or a need for practice.

Taking the systems which accept God, let us take first the Yoga system. It contributes five *sūtras*.

Īśvara-praṇidhānāt vā (I.23)¹: Or (concentrations) is attained by devotion to the Īśvara

Kleśa-karma vipākāśayair aparśamṛstaḥ. puruṣa viśeṣa Īśvaraḥ (I.24)

“Untoughed by hindrances or Karmas or fruition or by latent deposits Īśvara is special kind of Self”.

Ītra niratiśayam sarvajñābijam (I.25)

¹ Tans. Wood. Hos. Kleśa is really affliction and not merely hindrance. Āśa is a vehicle (cf.S.B.H.ed trans), the other sūtras referring to devotion to Īśavara Y.S.II. 1; II.32. II.45.

Cf. *Great Epic of India*: Hopkins regarding theism and deism in yoga of the Mahābhārata.

“In this (Īśvara) the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence”.

Sa eṣa puruṣam api Guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt (I.26)

“Teacher of the Primal (Sages) also, for as much as (with Him) there is no limitation by Time!”.

Tasya Vācakam praṇavaḥ (I.27)

“The word expressing Him is the Mystic Syllable (PraṇAvadhani)”

The Lord exists for the purpose of meditation and devotion since he is beyond all the afflictions, and actions and fruitions. He is the highest limit of intelligence, whom none exceed in wisdom, and He is the supreme Guru of all the ancients, unlimited too by time as he is, He is the eternal being, free from beginning or middle or end, and His name is PraṇAvadhani, Om.

In Yoga we find that God is conceived as the ideal Person or Puruṣa necessary indeed for meditation and devotion. He is a liberated being unlimited by bondage, supreme in his knowledge, omniscient and eternal. The argument appears to be identical with ontological argument that because we have an Idea of a perfect being, Supreme Being, He must exist. But there are two additional arguments which point out that the great Patanjali (or Hiraṇyagarbha) was aware of the inefficacy of the ontological argument which assumes existence because we can think of, of the idea of the perfect being as the limit, the highest. Īśvara is the Guru, the one Being who because of His eternal Existence and uncontracted knowledge and who has never been the subject to bondage or sorrow and karma – fruits, had permitted the universe to continue as an orderly universe by teaching the ancients who have handed over the traditional knowledge through

the centuries. If such a Person is not, there would be eternal darkness and none would have known anything, this argument resembles the theological argument of the Western Philosophers, but is different in so far as it intelligence who is willing to teach the truths of the scriptures and revelations to all at all times. This teacher's qualification or willingness is not however explained except in the commentary by Vyāsa: "Although He is above all feelings of self gratification, yet (to this Īśvara) the gratification of living beings is a sufficient motive¹". Compassion is the principal motive of God and this is clearly attained through the self – surrender taught in four sūtras (I.2 II.1: II 92; II. 45). Surrender is the condition as it were of His grace. The relation of God to man thus is one of compassion generally for the souls wallowing in sorrow, actions and their fruits (Kleśa-karma-vipāka). God so far is a necessity as the teacher of Highest perfection rather than as a Lord or Governor or Creator. He is the Ideal Being of knowledge whose existence is necessitated by the actual existence of knowledge and śāstras and the Vedas which reach Him. It is to re-enforce this Vedic authority, for His existence that the next sūtra (I.27) says Tasya vācakaḥ Praṇavaḥ.² The Mystic syllable OM is His name.

¹ J.H. Wood's translation. *Tasyātmānugrahābhāvepi bhūtā nugrahaḥ prayojam*

² Munduka; Kaṭha; Īśa: ctf. Dr.B.Das. *PraṇAvadhani Vāda*.

God has been conceived as Īśvara not only because of His causality, nor only because of His more supremacy but also, and mainly because of His being the supreme Intelligence, Omniscience and Freedom from all bondages. The argument for His existence is through the uninterrupted teachings of śāstras transmitted to us. The perfect ness of the scriptures is evidenced by His perfection, whereas the existence of His perfection is evidenced by the actual existence of these scriptures, a circular argument assuredly. Our inferences however can only lead up to the concept of such a being but not His actual existence. Īśvara as the highest God of Yoga is not even an operative Cause, the

nimitta kāraṇa. He is a world-teacher, a resplendent being standing transcendent or above the process having no relationship to it, a radiant star in the sky from time sempiternal, full of compassion ignorant wallowing bond seals, different in every respect from the other creatures, unequalled by anyone, free from any contraction of His intelligence either in dissolution or creation. He is a savior in so far as He is always ready to impart the secret of immortal existence and release from matter; His very non-causality of the world is something which protects Him from the charge of partiality and inequalities of creation as between the soul. But whilst it does grant him relief from the odium of being the cause of evil, in another since it involves a deep line of pain to be writ on His face because of the knowledge of the suffering of the innumerable number of souls which He would fain succor from their distress, and this because of the omniscient compassion that He is endowed with, Īśvara thus in Yoga is a glorious and grand being, but not even philosopher – King of all creature. He is a splendid spectator of the unequal struggles of creatures for freedom from bondage.

Though no clear-cut argument for the existence of God is given in the Yoga-sūtras, yet as I have pointed out, the implications of the arguments point out to the need for the apprehension of the Object of adoration as a necessity on a part with necessity to assume the existence of a transcendent God unsusullied by the process, unaffected by the sins and misery and yet deeply conscious of the need for Love. The Lord is shown as compassionate teacher, loving the soul intensely and guiding them on the Good path. He is not Ahura Mazda of Zoroaster, a fighting God, a captain of the trughstriving souls, by the leader of men, a leader who leads through His puissance, for he is the Vision. The promise is an omniscience equal to His Whilst we may gratefully acknowledge than actual implication of the sūtras dealing with God they do not lead us to assume anything more about Him. Yet the very implications of the chapter on the siddhis which are of eightfold kind, point out that this supreme Omniscience is something higher and greater than these. As such to possess this Omniscience means to be in possession of those siddhis too, which belong to it as such. thus Īśvara is not

absolutely void of powers and capacities, but what is not clear is whether He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. In so far as this is not clearly enunciated by the Yoga system it does not meet the total demands of the religious consciousness. Religion demand finally a creator whose creatures were are, a supreme Power in splendour unsurpassed, and in strength unequalled.

Turning to the Nyāya-sūtras we may at the very start say that we do not have much help from the Sūtras themselves. The Vaiśeṣika sūtras do not mention God even once. There are three sutras pertaining to the topic of the Īśvara in the Nyāya Sūtras.

Īsarah kāraṇam puruṣa – karma – phalyādarśanāt IV,i.19

Na puruṣa-karmābhavā phalaṇiṣpatteḥ IV.i.20

Tat kāritavād ahetuḥ IV.i.21

The interpretation of these three sūtras has been very confused and some treat the first to be a pūrva-pakṣa which holds that “Īśvara is the cause because of the fruits of the karma of the individual not being perceived.” This it is said is answered by “Not so, because in the absence of the man’s acts the fruit is not produced;” and the last sūtra determines as it were that “It (man’s agency) is not the (sole) cause, because that is caused by that¹, “The obscurity of the meaning will be apparent. Considered in conjunction with the later developments we may say that first sūtra appears to be the Siddhānta rather than the *pūrvapakṣa*. the creation is made by God not for the sake of merely bringing about the fruits of karma of the individuals, since if the individuals did not perform their activities, the creation could not come about. This is the second sūtra; and the third sutra points ou that the difference between the fru8its of actions of the individuals are due to their accompanying Īśvara’s will and do not form the sole cause. That is to say Īśvara is the Cause of the universe not having as His purpose the bringing about the fruits of individuals alone.

¹ *Indian Wisdom: Monier Williams. PP.55.*

If that were the only purpose, then *adr̥ṣṭa* would have been enough. It is because creation is not merely due to the need to fulfill the fruits of actions of individual that there is needed a God, an Īśvara. The teleology then of the creation is not accepted. God is needed to explain the actual existence of the Universe, and the universe is not dependent upon the need for the individuals, as a field for their achievements or enjoyments of fruits, Further *adr̥ṣṭa*, the unseen force that is described as the potency in all the movements of atoms of fire and air and other elements¹, also appears as “the unseen force derived from the works or acts of the previous world” (*sañcīta and prrārabda karma*). Whilst it has the limited potency of making movements of the atoms and souls and karmas, it is incapable of imitating the creation of the world. It is this limitation on the powers of *adr̥ṣṭa*, that entails the postulations of the Īśvara. The *adr̥ṣṭa* may do limited office for the Divine Īśvara, even as the *apūrva* of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsākās. It is therefore that the great Udayana had to undertake to prove the existence of Īśvara strictly on logical grounds: that the world or creation is of the nature of an effect, that therefore there is needed a cause which brings out this effect, that this should be an intelligence of the highest order since limited intelligences cannot produce such unique effects as creative process. These arguments have been roundly criticized by the Vedānta as trying to prove too much. All that we can show is that there could be but not that there must be. The proof for the actual existence of an infinite creator of Cause, of an Unmoved Mover can only be through revelation.

¹ *Tarka – samgraha: pratyaksa paricchedah 11. M.M. Kuppuswami Sastriar’s translation.*

The syncretist schools of Nyāya distinguished between two types of intelligences;

jñānāraṇam atma. Sa dvivdhaḥ Jīvātma

*paramātmā ceti. Tatra Īśvaraḥ sarvajñāḥ paramātmā eka eva,
jīvastu pratiśrīram bhinno ivbhuh nityaśca*¹

“The substratum in which cognition inheres is the soul (ātman). It is of two kinds-the supreme Soul and the individual soul. Of these two, the supreme Soul is one and is the omniscient Lord. The individual soul, on the other hand is different in association with different bodies though it is allpervasive and eternal.”

The eternal intelligence is One, the souls are many. The creative process was imitated by God, and once this was done *adrṣṭa* did and is doing the rest. It acts as the mechanical principle and as equally a mechanical result giving principle for the souls. It is not intelligent; its intelligence must therefore be referred to something that is intelligent.

It need not itself be intelligent-stuff, as in immanent factor but like the potter it is necessary that it should have a moulder. The fact that plants and seeds and plants come in a particular order should not make us think that they are not

¹ As pointed out earlier, *adrṣṭa* is the first intellectual statement of the implicit reason in things in Indian Philosophical Schools. The *Apūrva* of *Mīmāṃsā* again is the unseen reason or power in Karma results of Vedic rites. The primitive *Mana*, *Orenda* or Christian *Grace* are less intelligible terms as compared to these.

effects due to an operating cause. The Greeks, especially *Anaxagoras*, thought of an intelligent principle which explains the ordering of the process and combinations. It is something that is not referable to the innate forces of repulsion or attraction, falling down and crashing into one another or inhering in one another. Chance is not the final word and *adrṣṭa* may well be chance or the impersonal power in all things, elements etc. to make *adrṣṭa* itself explicable and

rational it is necessary to postulate an intelligent principle *nous*, comparable to the God of Nyāya. Īśvara accordingly is one who is an operative cause and nothing more. Once then the causal argument is accepted, whilst we may not be able to prove the immanence of this principle as an involve principle in this universe or as the material cause *upādāna kāraṇa* , we can affirm the need for postulating the operative or *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the universe.

God who has thus been established as the Īśvara in Nyāya is the cause of the process in a more direct sense. Cause means the power to bring about a particular result and it is thru that the presence of this power is not felt except as natural law. further the criticism against this idea of the first cause or efficient cause, the unmoved mover of Aristotel, who is beyond and above the process, is yet unanswered. God's infinite nature cannot be proved nor His existence determined by any proofs that we can bring. The Nyāya view however in one sense continues to hold the view that the Cause, the operative cause, is different front the universe or effect which it causes, and in this sense that *asat-kārya-vāda* has a place. It tries to point out that *asat-ārya-vāda* is true in so far as we perceive the effect to be different the cause and as such not in the cause. The *sat – ārya – vāda* on the other hand, points out that the cause is itself the effect in a prior state and the manifestation of itself is the effect. The implication of the intelligence in the process is affirmed by the one and denied by the other. But the attempt to explain the process as something definitely ordered by an external intelligence, a creator – God however extraneous to the process, is the Nyāya conception of the Deity. It is not necessary that God, as an efficient cause, should be implicated as a changing and manifesting force. Suffice it to say that His ordering is like the government of a king. This is the argument for the *Viśveśa*, the Lord of the Universe.

This view does not make God the origin and the sustainer of the universe in a material (*Upādāna*) sense as we all. But whether it is necessary at all in a strict theism to accept the material causality of God in addition to His efficient or

operative causality is an important question. The creator has been established but the total nature of the deity or God is not exhibited. The existence of an external ruler is, as yet at the stage of postulation. The world is a creation and the Creator should be, mainly because of the newer and newer potentialities coming into existence. This is all that we have in the system.

The all-knowing sentient principle under whose supervision the good and evil (*dharmādharmā*) of the souls, unintelligent in themselves though having the potentiality of sentience, bear fruit, is God who is the operative Cause as well as the wise dispenser of fruits of action.¹

The Sāmkhya system has, on the contrary, refuted the idea and existence of the Īśvara. It contends that Īśvara is not different from the highly evolved souls. Souls free from attachment, subtle and free from the implications of the dance of Prakṛit and verily Īśvaras.

The four sūtras pertaining to the Īśvara are: - -

Īśvarāsiddheḥ;

Muktabaddhayor anyatarābhāvānna tat siddhiḥ;

Ubhayathāpyasatkarativam;

Muktātmanah praśamsa upāśasiddhasya vā

“Īśvara is unproved.” “Nor could there be any proof of his existence since he could not be either free from or bound by troubles of any kind.” “ In either way he could not be cause or creator.” “Utmost He can be only a liberated soul.” This conclusion whilst showing clearly that inference cannot prove the Īśvara, also points out that if inference is to be our guide Īśvara can well be likened to a liberated soul. He is not any different or distinguished entity as such. the arguments brought forward to show that Īśvara cannot be the cause of the world on the basis of sat-kārya-vāda can be considered to apply to material causality rather than to efficient causality. Inferentially speaking the claim that mere

mechanical nearness, Inferentially speaking the claim that mere mechanical nearness, *sānnidhyam*, is enough to bring about the changes in matter, converts the *sāmkhya* system into a kind of materialistic doctrine upholding *svabhāva-vāda*. It may be assumed then

¹ *Cf. Nyāya Sūtra: IV.i.21*

that the argument against *Īśvara* is in the main negative, namely, God cannot be proved by inference; and this might have led to the defense of the position that God is not necessary even as the efficient cause. Instead a teleological cause is supplied namely the enjoyment of *puruṣa*. this in fact is the weakness in the entire doctrine.

A theistic interpretation indeed is possible as is evidenced by the earlier *Sāmkhya* presentation(?) in the *Mahābhārata*. The *Sāmkhya* thus, like *Nyāya*, stops at the point of inferring the transcendent Spirit. A naturalistic interpretation with the help of *adrṣṭa* does the same office as the *sannikarṣa* or *sānnidhya* in the *Sāmkhya*.

The rationalistic trend is certainly more strong in the *Sāmkhya* conception than in the other two, and the naturalistic explanation is found to rest on a foundation not so sure as may be first be intended. A logical basis for the existence of God is impossible. A metaphysical need for a world principle, a world – reason, especially a world-end or a world-cause alone dictates the acceptance of God. And it is precisely this moreness of the metaphysical view which transcends the limits of logic.

It is usually contended that *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* also declines to accept the existence of God not for the reason that He might not exist but that He is a superfluity. The mechanical equivalence that is usually made between the actions or rites or sacrifices and their fruits, the imperative of *ritu* or *frutigiving* by

the several gods invoked, makes the gods the creature of the does of rites. Achievements of yogic powers of seers which make them masters of the forces of nature, of gods who are the lords of the elements and of the many mansions of the universe, reveal the fact that mantra and ritual are more than the gods. This appears to be, despite the supernatural agencies involved, a mechanical affair. Given the rite, the result must follow. The more exact and proper the rite, the more thorough and complete the mastery. Mistakes and calamities follow wrong and improper performance. These results do not depend upon the moral quality of the agent nor upon the moral purpose behind the act, Killing and slaughter may well be the aims of the sacrifice and these will be achieved by the mantra and the mystic power that comes out of the rite. This mystic power non-existent previously. *Apūrva*, thus is not only the impotent of the law of relations between the rite and fruit, but may, for all that we know, only point out the superiority of the Veda. The author of the Veda is inconceivable. The eternal laws verily cannot have any authors but can have discoverers, seers and auditors. Veda fails in this category of eternal verities, and as such it is *apauruṣeya*, not man made, nor God-made too. Law is greater than the law-giver. The denial, however, is too specific in the Sūtras of Jaimini. God is not admitted as a creator or destroyer of the universe, nor as the law-giver nor law-maker, since all these would impugn the eternity of the Veda. But as Venkaṭanātha had pointed out, the Pūva-Mīmāsā, should not be read apart from the Uttara-mīmāṃsā, in which case, the denial of an inferred Īśvara will not be contradictory to the revealed Īśvara of the Vedānta¹.

¹ *Paramabhanga: Niriśvara mīmāṃsā Bhanga.*

All that we discover then by viewing these systems as a constructive synthesis in respect of the special topic under discussion is that God is endowed with all auspicious qualities. He transcends all the material qualities. He is a Guru and an Object of adoration; He is perfect and luminous and omniscient and the ordained of law which He does not Himself set at naught. He thus distributes

impartially the deserts of actions and rituals performed by each and thus is *karmādhyakṣa*. he is not capable of being proved with the help of inferences and analogies or perception. It is only by means of revelation; and the vision got through the grace of the Divine that we can know Him. Even the Veda has given us but glimpses of His supreme transcendent nature and has shown Him as a wonderful being infinitely more supreme than what has been mentioned or communicated by even the seers of the Vedas.

As a philosopher wrote “a God whom we could see would no more be a God,”¹ but a God who can never be seen can never be a God either. But it should be well appreciated to everything that we know. It is the Vedānta which firmly insists that it would not be enough to know the law; we shall know the law-giver, the Source and ground of all law. God is at once the Supreme Being free from all imperfections and possessing all blessed qualities in infinite measure. This Ubhayalinga² quality cannot be asserted on the basis of the

¹ *Philosophical Tendencies of the Present day*: Stein: trans S.Maitra

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² *Vedānta Sūtras* II.ii.11-25

inference. Inference as pointed out will only lead to the concept of God, or mere thought of Him.

“God not only can be thought but he must be thought whilst we must refer the pyramid of laws and ends in the world to a highest principle of order called God.”

One thing is clear that the logical necessity by which we mean the necessity of thought is that by which one has to explain the causal ground of the

Universe. We may with Feuerbach affirm that “God is my first, the world is my next, and man is my third and last thought”, and using pure reason we may arrive at the supreme concept of God. That this concept of God can be the highest abstraction of which the human mind is capable, may be admitted; but whether it is the final expression of truth is quite a different matter, God indeed is the logical premise of the universe, but should this logical premise be an Absolute or Concept, the unchangeable and unchanging essence of the world even as Śankara and Plato saw? That this God is best apprehended as the essence of all existence and as such the most comprehensive existence must be granted. But is it necessary to affirm that God cannot also be in existence even perceptually? is it also necessary to affirm that this God, if He were at any time amenable to sense-experience should therefore become a doubtful existence.

God is integral and if He be the cause of the Universe, He must participate in its total existence; and, as such, we may concede that He is existent and perishing or rather taking on new forms at His will. The integral view cannot abolish God nor can it make God just a concept and grant it a conceptual ‘existence’ and nothing more. The belief in the relative truthness of thought as against sense has been the cause of this unfortunate denial of existence to God or the Absolute or rather the unfortunate limitation of meaning of existence to the ideal being and not to sense, which is denied as false or merely phenomenal existence. Religious consciousness and mystic affirmations lead to the affirmation of existence of the Divine or God neither on grounds of perceptibility by sense nor on grounds of conceivability by thought, but on the ground of revelation or Vision (got through the grace) (prasāda) of the Divine, as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has declared.