

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

We have seen that in perception what is presented is a differenced object. What is presented even in the very initial sensation like the *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is a *samsthāna-rūpa* a structure-event, and not a bare existence. Even in the intuitive perception or vision we are not aware of any identity of mere consciousness or absolute consciousness but are aware of a supreme personality, who is the Ultimate Deity or God. Even the *nirvikalpaka-samādhi* of the Yogi, to which appeal is made, does not annihilate the subject-object relation, since self-consciousness is yet a consciousness of the Self *by itself*.

With the refutation of the consciousness as object of perception, we are presented with the problem of what consciousness is? The objects are not certainly psychic stuff or consciousness-stuff, either as limited or unlimited, either fictionally or really. The fact that consciousness goes *along* with every object of cognition does not entail the conclusion that this invariable connection or relation is proof of the psychic stuff theory or the imaginal theory of Yogācāra.

We may therefore ask the next question as to how or rather why consciousness is more related to the subject side rather than to the object side in cognition? That is to say having shown that consciousness can exist apart from its outer objects as in introspection, dream and imagination, we find that even under these conditions we are unable to refute the subjects of cognition. As we have already said the subject owns the consciousness rather than that consciousness that fulgurates into subjects and objects.

We cannot raise the function or adjective or qualities of a subject to the level of a substance. Idealistic thought feels chary of accepting the absoluteness of the terms and yet no repugnance is felt when the *subject* and object are reduced to a function. Even if this function becomes infinite, it can never give up being the function of a subject.

The exact reason for this kind of epistemology is not far to seek. Every experience makes the object come into existence in a, consciousness and therefore it becomes possessed by consciousness. This possession in other words makes the object an adjective of that consciousness. Thus it follows from another rule that the adjective can never exist *apart* from its substrate, that this adjective also cannot exist apart from the consciousness which now possesses it. This is the rationale if it be one, for the ego-centric *predicament*. Further the stream of consciousness is possessed of these objects and their images; and all these objects reveal transitoriness of existence. The continuity of consciousness as a stream grants it the

quality of being the substrate of these experiences of objects. Consciousness becomes an eternal and universal background of all phenomenal experiences.

Against such views as these, Rāmānuja holds that the seeming absoluteness of consciousness, or rather its universal presence has been misunderstood and misinterpreted for the sake of a false metaphysics. It is based on false psychology. A correct epistemological understanding of the nature of consciousness would require a more detailed study of consciousness and its processes. Perhaps it may be said that all psychology and epistemology are worthless, since they deal with the already vitiated experience or categorized a priori experience. In reply we can only say that such a wholesale illusion cannot be cured. Further there is no proof of its truth. A false understanding of psychology is bound to obsess a mind given to a mere metaphysical pursuit of reality. A correct understanding of consciousness reveals according to *Rāmānuja* five fundamental features

I. Consciousness is an attribute belonging to a permanent subject and is not the pure □that□ or existence which is observed in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*.

II. Consciousness is not a permanent but a transitory function, or rather it is present whenever the subject cognizes. It is not eternal in the sense that it is not always in action, for consciousness itself testifies to its absence as in the judgements □I was not aware, I was asleep. Consciousness is itself limited in time.□

III Consciousness is a function of a subject *Samviditi svāśrayam prati sattayaiva kasyacit prakāśanaśīlo jñāna vagaty anubhūtyādi padaparyāyanāmā sakarmakaḥ samveditur ātmano dharmah prasiddhaḥ* says Yāmunācārya¹. It is neither a stream nor an expanse nor is it made up of discrete snatches of momentary experiences like links in a chain. But it is also true that consciousness is aware of its absence, *abhāva*. It cannot prove that consciousness was present during its own absence, as some contend, on the principle that there must be something that perceived the absence. Subjects persist in sleep, and even in death in a state of what Dr. Mac Taggart calls □suspended animation□, where consciousness is absent or, in other words, not active, due to lack of body or lack of co-ordination. Consciousness exists as power in that state as potent, and not as act. There is valid perception of non-consciousness (*anupalabdhi*) in the same way as there is valid

¹ Srī Bhāṣya. I.i.1. Anubhūtiprāgabhāvāde – siddhvatat-sama-kāla- bhāvanīyam, 'stīti' Kim tvayā kvacid evam dr̥ṣṭam? Yena niyamam bravīṣi. Hanta tarhi tata eva darśanāt prāgabhāvādisiddha iti na tadapahnaḥ tatprāgabhavanām ca tastamakālavartinam anumattaḥ, ko bravīti Indiyajanmanaḥ pratyakṣasya hyesa svabhāva niyamaḥ, yatsvasamakāla vartinaḥ padārthasya grāhakatvam. Ananda Press ed. Voll, p.31. Anubhūtitvam nāma vatamānadaśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam svasattayaiva svaviśayasādhanatvam vā. (Ananda press, ed, vol I. P.30-31.

perception of darkness or black colour or nonexistence (*abhāva*):

IV. Consciousness is neither agent nor subject but the act of cognition of a subject to whom it is specially related as a function, dharma or viśeṣana. It is not a witness. *sākṣi*, for witnessing implies the subject ness of consciousness. □ A knowing subject only, not mere consciousness is spoken of as witness: *sākṣitvam ca sākṣāt, - jñātrtvam eva*. Consciousness is a function of a subject.

V. Consciousness is not the *Absolute* Brahman nor yet the atman the individual soul. Because even though one might seek to dissolve all souls or subjects into objects of the Divine Lord or dependent on His absolute existence the effort will not entail the granting the nature of being a substance to consciousness.

These five fold objections against the monistic idealistic theory of Consciousness are serious enough. Rāmānuja shews that on grounds of actual experience and discriminate criticism there is no ground at all for asserting that consciousness is a substance or a witness or pure experience without subject or object. The true nature of consciousness reveals its polarity towards a subject to which it is invariably absolutely attached. Because this consciousness is observed in all subjects, it cannot be claimed that all these individual consciousness are fulgurations or fragments of a universal consciousness or phenomenal representations or copies or reflections of a absolute consciousness. The problem that confronts the epistemologist is a serious one, thanks to the endeavors of the introspecting idealists. A universal consciousness which has been arrived at through a process of intense cogitation and refunding is an abstraction, a fiction and not a real existence. It is a concept, a limiting one perhaps, but it is nevertheless a fiction. □ Whatever else is real, the finite mind of which each one of us is immediately aware is real. Any notion of a ground of things which is incompatible with the reality of finite minds □ has to be rejected as contrary to what we are bound to accept as a fact. The question whether the absolute consciousness is a consciousness *only* has not been faced by the idealists. A theory of consciousness; falls or lives on an adequate answer to this question.

II Consciousness not a Substance

Rāmānuja argues at considerable length against the theory that consciousness is a substance.

I. Consciousness is an attribute of a conscious self who is the permanent or eternal being behind all change. The essential character of consciousness is that by its very nature it renders things capable of becoming objects to its own substrate or

thought and speech. □Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of agent or as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself agent, as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent□. Consciousness is like light that reveals the object as well as itself to the substrate, *svaparanirvāhaka*, and does not need a third entity to relate it to itself.

II. Some persons hold that consciousness is the result of an act of cognizing or compresence of an object and the subject. This has been maintained by the Nyāya school which holds consciousness to be a product due to compresence (*sannikarṣā*) between and object and sense organs of the subject. Consciousness thus defined would be an epi-phenomenon, distinct indeed from the subject and object, and therefore a new thing. This view might with ease be shown to lead either to cārvaka material or the idealistic theory of consciousness.

But Nyāya also holds that this situation itself is consciousness. It is contended that the object was unconscious before the cognitive situation or compresence. The latter theory makes for the conclusion that is subject is himself of the stuff of unconsciousness (*jada vastu*) and that he is capable of becoming conscious only through the conjunction, *sāmyoga*, with the object. Consciousness in the Nyāya-theory becomes thus only referable to the subject as quality that emerges in it due to the objective situation. In the absence of this objective situation it lapses into a state of non-consciousness.

These conclusions do not follow according to Rāmānuja, because the individual subject is capable of affirming himself as a self existent conscious being without any need of a sensory compresence with an object. Perhaps this objection is invalid for the simple reason that the inner sense like the *manas* acts in *samvedanā*, introspection, which connects itself with its self. The sensory contact with an object only calls into being consciousness which is by no means a product, not a new and original entity coming into being because of the relation of compresence as a synthesis of opposites, but as the act of the subject who knows the object. The theory of realism standing on the rock of *asatkārya vāda* could not accept the principle of inherence except as a external relation and never as a quality that is inseparably (*apṛathaksiddha*) related Nyāya theory based on intellectual atomism and rationalism multiplied entities and categories galore and affirmed external relation between all things without any distinction. So much so even consciousness was bound to be a product of a relation, an epiphenomenon in that system. No wonder therefore that every entity and category can only be connected by another entity and soon *ad infinitum*. Yet even that system has to recognize at the hands of the new school of Nyāya the *sva-para-nirvāhakatva* of the relations. Despite this, consciousness is not adequately explained in that system. Further Memory becomes an inexplicable problem in Nyāya.

The independence claimed for consciousness is impossible. It is neither a product nor an independent entity. It is the activity or quality of a subject when it comes into contact with outer objects. It is a dynamic function, even as the Buddhist thought avers. It is however the inseparable adjunct of self which is capable of becoming self-conscious. Consciousness also reveals memories and recognizes past objects of experience. Consciousness in one of its major roles is memory, *smṛti*. It is more than this. It reveals the objects that are present before it in time and as such is implied in *pratyākṣa*. As bringing memory from the past into the present consciousness in relation to perceived objects is the consciousness active in recognition: and in keeping all images of previous experiences and perceptions it is memory that not a little influences our perceptions; and as the revelatory perception also it is this self same consciousness that is in function. In dreams too, this consciousness is present but it is only during sleep, *susupti*, it is absent or incapable of presenting anything to its substrate. Thus it is an inseparable function² of the subject in all cognitive activities whatever. Consciousness is also *apoha* - conjecture or *ūhanum* or future knowledge³. The subject is not a focalization of consciousness, but is the substrate of this consciousness even as a flame is the *substrate* of the rays of light issuing from it which reveals the subject as well as the object and itself too. It appears when the self is active, and is absent when it is inactive. As William James Wrote □I mean only to deny that the word (consciousness) stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function.□□⁴

III

Consciousness as attribute

Consciousness is an attribute of a self, a quality *viśeṣaṇa*, inseparable and intrinsic to the self itself. On the occasion of every cognition it emerges to the fore and reveals the nature of the object to its substrate. In waking life it is always and *continuously* operating, and reveals the outer objects to *its* substrate, and makes possible the judgments such as □I see that □, □ I perceive that as red□, □Here in this□. Whilst the *Nyāya* system holds that consciousness is a novel product, an emergent so to speak at the beginning when the souls resting in *pralaya* like stones *pāṣāṇavat*, came into contact with objects or rather congregations of atoms, like a light that arises from a wick, Rāmānuja does not treat consciousness to be a product or an emergent at any time, but that which is inalienably and inseparably

² Vedārtha samgraha : 237: Jñānena dharmeṇa svarūpa-nirūpam, na tu jñānamātram brahmeti Cf. Siddhi Traya, p.17: Svārūpa attayaiva samvidāindriya-sannikarṣa-ṇeva viśayaḥ prakāṣate.

³ Gitā Bhāṣya XV. 15.

⁴ Cf, William James: “ Does Consciousness Exist.”

aprathaksiddha-dharma of the conscients even as the light is of the flame.

Whilst the Vijñānavāda doctrine pleads for consciousness and the stream of mental states as the only reality thus avoiding a self, that is other than the illusory permanence of the stream contents, *samskāra skanda*, Rāmānuja shows that this position cannot help at all, since the stream state or the so-called store house of consciousness is itself of momentary states, and thus even the *samskāra-skanda* can never resolve the difficulty of memory or recognition. A permanent consciousness is an impossible, notion, since consciousness is of states and objects, *and* is undoubtedly not permanent. There must be a basis in which these states find a permanent and this must be other than the stream of consciousness, which is discontinuous as we have seen. Thus consciousness cannot be the self, whether this consciousness be a momentary store-house of impressions, or a permanent stream or even a permanent self, since consciousness is not found to be permanent at all. Memory and Recognition impugn the consciousness itself as the self. Consciousness *belongs* to a self and is not the self itself. The self persists under all changes and Vicissitudes. Not so consciousness which is found to be in deep sleep at any rate, non-existent.

Rāmānuja holds that consciousness is neither transient in the sense of momentary *kṣāṇika*, nor permanent in the sense of Advaita or *Sāṃkhya*: it is a function, *dharma*, dependent upon the needs and conditions of its substrate.

IV

Consciousness as absent

Consciousness proves its own absence in the affirmation □I was asleep□, or □I was not aware□. In sleep the self is inactive and not only unaware of external objects but also of internal images or dreams.

Externality or objectivity is of two kinds, the one is real externality of objects that exist independent of the individual's consciousness or perception, the other is the field of memory *antaḥkaraṇa*, which can be surveyed through remembrance and recollection. In deep sleep both these fields are not available for inspection or introspection.

There are two views of this deep sleep. The self is functionally passive. It is mere selfness without action at all either inwards or outwards. It is impossible to consider this state to be a state of passive awareness. That the self might be self-luminous and as such be in a state of light is possible, but that there is awareness of

any other objects, ideal or real, is out of the question. The Yogic description says that the self rests in the cave of the heart, that the self goes to the Highest in deep sleep. Gaudapada says that this stage is the stage of quiescence and lordship, *svayam-prakāśa-īśatva*; but no one ever affirms that there is cognition. It is likely that this self luminosity of the self (ātman or jīva) has been mistaken for the activity of the consciousness, its function. The existence of self along- with the non-existence of the consciousness under certain conditions is possible. Hence do we infer the presence of the self even in that state of deep sleep not because consciousness perceives its own non-presence which is a self-contradiction but because the self recollects that it was non-functioning. Further there is nothing self contradictory in consciousness inferring its own past non presence. If no self is accepted and if consciousness is alone said to exist, then it is impossible to explain the possibility of sleep, since there is inherent contradiction between existence and non-existence of *consciousness at the same time*. Therefore the argument for the existence of a self, other than but never separable from consciousness which is its quality, function or adjunct, gets reinforced by this theory, whilst it is a pretty definite weakness in the theories which make consciousness itself the self.

V

Consciousness neither the witness nor the self

It is a feeling of certitude of our own being aware that makes us recognize the distinction between ourselves and our awareness of objects and desires. It is usually contended that the use of the word 'I' in the sentence 'I am aware' is due to ignorance, for the 'I' is said to be merely a closely-knit system of energies, memories and desires. Further we are told following the great experienced of Buddhists, who anticipated centuries earlier Hume's criticisms, that we never catch a self when we introspect, *sva-samvedanā*. Therefore the self is a *kalpana* a creation by intellect. It is usually the sense of unity of the physical body that makes us affirm a self that has at least as much *unity* and identity as the body. It is a practical convenience to refer this unity to the self which is just a reflection of the unity of the body and its organs. It is because the body is tired and is incapable of perception that we say that we are asleep. Sleep is not a condition of the self but of the bodily nature. Does not Yoga say that sleep must be avoided? Sleep is a product of ignorance and is productive of ignorance. Awareness is the true nature of the self and is the self itself. Consciousness thus is self itself or rather there is no self at all but only consciousness.

All the above arguments, from diverse sources, do not make the notion of a permanent self impossible, for the self is not an object of thought but is that which can be realized in a direct vision or intuition. Try as we may it is impossible to find the self apart from the consciousness which is its function. But that does not make for the

reversion of the relationship between consciousness and self. Consciousness is never the *sākṣī*, the witness but only the function of a witness which is found to be the experience of all individuals. If on a priori deduction is ever to be made we should say that it is necessary that the witnessing self should exist a priori and not that consciousness should exist a priori.

VI

Consciousness not the Absolute

It is impossible to identify consciousness with the Absolute, the Absolute that is the ground of all experience and life and being just because the absolute has been characterized as Personality possessing power and perfection and bliss. Consciousness is none of these but the patient hand maid, not even a separate handmaid. Rāmānuja views consciousness not as being in itself luminous but that its self luminosity is something that it gains by being the function of the self that is self-luminous.⁵ The self is the very stuff of self-luminosity, whether it rests in itself or the Divine Lord, or in freedom or in sleep, or whether it is active in the *svapna* or *jāgrat*: it is essential self luminous and luminous in its own nature for itself. *svayamprakāśa* and *svasmai prakāśa*⁶.

There is one objection that might with success be brought against the theistic and common - sense position of Rāmānuja: *namely*, all these are perhaps true of the ordinary human consciousness. This we also admit but they are not true of the absolute Consciousness. Illusion makes all the difference. Here there may be a subject and even a self, but there there is no need for self or anything resembling it but Pure Undifferented Absolute Consciousness. This view whilst apparently unanswerable, is defining its position from a dichotomous view of reality that is intent upon misunderstanding and denying the world of apprehension as we know it, so as to enable us to postulate and affirm (a non-existent ideal universe) (*sic*) that is beyond all apprehension. In which case it is incapable of speaking about it and even knowing it in the sense of our knowing anything and what it experiences or perceives (supersensorially) or is said to be so experience, is something about which it cannot say anything, since it has itself to get dissolved in it never to come out of it again, *na*

⁵ Śrī Bhāṣya I.i.1.(Ananda Press ed. Vol I. P.36)

Mayi naṣṭe pi matto nyā kācijjñāptiravashitā |
Iti tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati ||
Svasaṁbandhitayā hyasyāssattā vijñaptitādi ca |
Svasaṁbandha viyoge tu jñaptireva na siddhyati ||
Chettuśchedyasya cābhāve chedanāderasiddivat |
Ato hamartho jñataiva partyagātmeti niścitiā ||

⁶ Ibid. Cid-rūpatā hi Svayamprakāśatā. P37

punarāvartate. Thus not only is epistemology impossible a fictional transaction but also Metaphysics and ordinary experience become fictional constructions, and beyond all this there is something or nothing(?) relatively speaking and knowledge becomes just approximation towards more or less unreality. In the Buddhistic schools these approximations are dynamically construed. In Advaita they are practically construed. In neither case, is reality possible within experience as we can know it. Further in these theories the constructive dynamism of thought is fundamentally of the vitiating character, Less and less of thought means more and more of Reality (*caitanya*).

Rāmānuja standing on the bed-rock of scriptural experience declares that more and more knowledge it is that leads to perfection of consciousness and not less and less. Knowledge it is that releases, not less of knowledge. And knowledge is not knowledge if it is indefinite and nebulous and more and more an approximation to experience of the *nirvikalpaka*, the indistinguishable limit of sensations. Degrees of consciousness go with degrees of perfection *and* not with degrees of *reality*. The doctrine of degree of reality is fatal to all reality. It is one thing to speak of awareness of the real, and the attainment of reality consciousness, and quite another to speak of relative reality and approximations to reality in the eternal reality.

VII

Consciousness as an attribute of a personality

We thus find that if it is admitted that consciousness is more of the subject than of the object, then □knowledge like pleasure manifests itself to that conscious person who is substrate and not to anybody else□. The self thus owns consciousness just as it does all experiences as manifested in the judgments □I know this,□ □I enjoy this□. Consciousness thus is not the absolute but the personal attribute of a self, invariably associated as its function, *dharma*. Therefore is it known as *dharma-bhūta jñāna* as distinguished from the *svayam-prakāśatvam* or *jīva* or the *kṣetrājñā*. It is creative in its perfect state of expansion (*vikāsa*), and in its lesser stages of perfection (*sañkoca*) it is not creative of reality, but has inventiveness based on the real which it apprehends, and thus is the source of illusions, which however always betray the core of the real in them to a discriminative consciousness That is to say, in imagination, *vikalpa* or *kalpana*, the capacity of consciousness to present the real is diminished, and fantasies and fictions are created instead To say that creative activity is not of consciousness is to deny the psychological truth of consciousness itself. This is not to deny that consciousness presents reality. Other factors than consciousness impede its presentation of the real. The creative activity of consciousness is a result of God□s own activity through the individuals who belong to Him.

VIII

Summary

Consciousness has been interpreted in various ways. In the Nyāya system⁷ consciousness is a separable attribute in the case of souls, but in the case of *Īśvara* or God inseparable, since, in the one case, there is no subordination to creation, and in the other case, there is. According to Mīmāṃsā or the Bhatta school, consciousness is a part of the soul whereas its other parts are unconscious. The iceberg theory of modern psychology is very powerfully recalled by these thinkers. In the Sāṃkhyan system, consciousness is an independent entity and is not dependent upon any situation. Nor is it conjunct with any self as a part of it or whole of it. Nor is it an epiphenomenon as in the materialistic school. The catalytic action which it exercises on the evolving psycho-physical dynamic principle *prakṛti* implies its becoming powerful, as well as a power to influence the becoming of some other things.

In the idealistic schools there are four sub-schools as it were. In the first consciousness is described as perfect knowledge, as an element of the supreme reality, but it is not the whole of it. Reality is full of infinity of attributes and there is nothing to suggest that consciousness or mind is that which supports all others. Spinoza and Rāmānuja agree in so far as they emphasize the richness of content of the Ultimate Reality. Pure consciousness according to this type of thought is an abstraction and not an experience. The second type whilst accepting the first view holds that pure consciousness is a reality not an abstraction. It is an illumination (*jyotiḥ*) of the Lord which all must realize. What this consciousness does is to radiate the light and perfection and supreme nature of the ultimate reality which is rich in power and has attributes of the transcendental kind.

The third type reverses the previous position and makes pure-consciousness the goal of the all effort and reduces reality being to an illusory abstraction or construction. Thus there is a conversion of the logical real into a figment of the imagination. No better is the theory of *ālayavijñāna* in Buddhistic thought. So too is the theory of Māya. The theory of the *śāktas* makes an adjustment in so far as it seeks to make pure consciousness (without content) as logical aspects of a supralogical Experience. In so far as this theory powerfully shews that consciousness as pure, (as described by Māyāvāda), is a logical outcome of the theory of reversion of substance-attribute relation, it refutes the view usually upheld that Māyāvāda view is the illogical culmination or the illogical highest. The śākta view holds further that the pragmatism

⁷ Hindu Realism : Jagadish Chatterjee, P.63. ff. Allahabad 1912

alone converts the alogical into logical or rather imposes its logical moulds on the alogical, even as Bergson claims.

Thus two points emerge: the attributive theory of Rāmānuja is the first, and it may approve even of the second: whilst the Māyāvāda and the śākta views are reversions of this view and hold a substantive view of consciousness. For Rāmānuja, consciousness is neither a stream nor a substance though it participates in *both* qualities. As a function of a soul it is known as jñāna. It is unlike a quality for it is deemed to be a *dravya* as it is capable of expansion and contraction, or in other words, capable of modification *avasthāvad dravyam*. It is a function of a subject or person expressing his perfection and richness according to the nature of the person as a perfect or released or bond being. If consciousness is particularized and attached to limited wants and interests, it leads to the mechanical dead level of uniformity and rigidity. If on the other it is either humanized or divinized by working for the perception of the highest reality there is proportional enlargement of consciousness. Release or freedom for an individual consists in the enlargement of his consciousness to the fullest level of parity with the Ever perfect Consciousness of the Divine Lord.

Consciousness is a stream as long as it lasts, that is to say as long as an object is possessed by it. This objectivity might be physical or mental, as in dreams and in reflection. It is found that consciousness tends to be active in a mild or full form according to the state of tension of the individual in dream states.

Consciousness in the sum total of all contents to which the ego stands in a certain unique relation which may be metaphorically indicated by the verb □to have □. □Everything falls within the sphere of consciousness which the ego has□□

□Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness and of a relation between the two□. □The only necessity for consciousness is the presence of this relation or function. The nature of the content which enters into relation with the ego is a matter of indifference. It may belong to the psychical or physical.□

□We must draw a sharp dividing line between the act of knowing on the one side and the object and content known on the other; the act of knowledge is always a psychical state of the subject knowing and bears the character of an event (in other words, it is temporal) which comes to pass at the moment in which judgment is formed. On the other hand, the object and content of knowledge may be non-psychical, trans-subjective, and may belong to a different point of time from the cognitive act.□

□According to our theory of knowledge even a changing and temporal content in so far as it is considered in relation to the act of knowing, may be a truth, that is, it has an eternal, identical and universally valid meaning. This result is not obtained by transforming a temporal element of the world into a timeless idea, but by admitting a specific and ideal relation between the subject knowing and the object known.□

□An act of cognition consists in a comparison. In this comparison sameness and differences are established that is, analysis is performed. In order that this psychological process may be set in motion, the presence of a certain something is necessary *with which the content of consciousness can be compared.*□□

□The act of judging is an analysis which seeks to lay bare the synthetic necessity of connection between the contents of consciousness □given-to-me□. The logical relation between subject and predicate of a judgment is not one of identity or of contradiction but of the synthetical necessity of connection. The judgment should be thrown into the form □Where S is, P necessarily is also.□ This relation is a *functional dependence*.

□There exists between the elements which make up the World a *functional dependence* and it is this very dependence, in so far as it forms the objective side of judgment, which represents a logical interconnection an interconnection determined by a synthetical necessity of combination.□

The above extracts are called from Professor Nicola Lossky□s important contribution on intuitive Logic entitled *Transformation of the Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology and its Bearing on Logic*⁸ to the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences* Vol I. They serve to illustrate the modernity of Sri Ramanuja□s views on the subject of consciousness.

⁸ cf. His Intuitive Basis of Knowledge